We explore the existence of drwr at the industry level, based on data from 19 oecd countries for the period 1973-99. We find that drwr compresses the distributions of industry wage changes overall, as well as for specific geographical regions and time periods, but there are not many real wage cuts that are prevented. More important, however, drwr attenuates larger real wage cuts, thus leading to higher real wages. We find stronger evidence for downward nominal wage rigidity than for drwr. There is evidence that real wage cuts are less prevalent in countries with strict employment protection legislation and high union density.
and η is the elasticity of product demand. 
and where D is a dummy variable which is equal to unity if real wages fall, and is zero 72 otherwise. As long as real wages do not fall, utility is simply linear in current real wages.
73
However, we allow for the possibility that workers have loss aversion, in the sense that 74 they compare their current wage with their past wage (if µ > 0), incurring an additional 75 utility loss if the real wage falls. In this case, utility is still continuous in current and 76 past real wages, and strictly increasing in current real wages. Yet there is a kink in the 77 utility function at the point where the wage is equal to its past value, implying that 78 utility is non-differentiable from the left (when w < w −1 ) at the point w = w −1 . In the 79 limiting point when µ = 0 there is no drwr.
80
We model the wage setting by use of the (symmetric) Nash bargaining solution,
81
where the bargaining outcome is the wage that maximizes the product of the firm's and 82 the worker's gain from reaching an agreement, that is the payoffs as compared to the 83 disagreement points, π 0 for the firm (for simplicity set to zero), and V 0 for the worker: 
If the bargainers fail to reach an agreement, the worker's disagreement point, V 0 > 0, will 85 depend on variables that influence the workers' payoff, such as the rate of unemployment, As in a standard wage bargaining model without a kink in the utility function (for 89 2 One interpretation of this formulation is a union-firm setup, where the union represents the interests of the median worker who by seniority rules is sheltered from redundancies. In most oecd countries, the majority of the workforce is covered by collective bargaining agreements. However, the key features could also be derived in an efficiency wage framework, as long as the crucial assumption that workers experience a utility loss if their wages fall is maintained. We omit that if the bargaining outcome is affected by past wages, rational agents should take the effect on future bargaining outcomes into consideration during the negotiations. The risk that drwr may bind in the future, pushing wages up, will lead wage setters to choose a lower wage today (see Holden, 1997 and Elsby, 2009 ). However, this consideration will not prevent the effect of drwr that binds, which is what we look for in the empirical analysis.
example Layard et al., 1991) , the wage is a markup over the workers' disagreement point, and the markup depends on the elasticity of product demand η. However, due to 91 the non-differentiability of the utility function, the negotiating outcome also depends on 
153
The change in the average earnings in a given industry is affected both by the average 154 change for job stayers, and by compositional effects due to differences in wages between 155 new hires and the workers that leave the industry. Prevalent drwr for individual workers 156 will in general lead to a deficit of negative changes in average real wages at industry level.
157
However, the compositional changes may blur this link.
158
Some compositional changes will be unrelated to the possible extent of drwr at the 159 individual level. Much of the turnover is caused by a number of idiosyncratic changes, 160 like workers moving for family motives. Such unsystematic turnover may be considered 161 as "noise" relative to individual wage rigidity, and make it more difficult to detect drwr 162 in our data. There will also be a systematic negative effect on average wages as older 163 workers who leave the labor force on average have higher wages than younger newcomers 164 to the labor market. One may also expect cyclical effects, as the share of low-skilled 165 workers may increase in expansions (see Solon et al., 1994) . This latter effect is likely 166 to dampen fluctuations in wage growth, thus reducing the number of wage cuts. For 167 instance, in recessions, when wage growth for job stayers is likely to be low, the increased 168 share of high-skilled workers will imply a positive compositional effect. Overall, the effect 169 of systematic compositional changes on the number of wage cuts is ambiguous. are strong we would detect less or no drwr in our data, but we would also expect there 177 to be little or no effect on employment or output at the industry level. In contrast, if
178
there are less such compositional effects, for example because employment protection 179 legislation prevents firms from laying off workers with high wages, or because collective 180 agreements at the industry level prevent jobs shifting from high wage to low wage firms,
181
we would detect drwr in our data. In this case, we would also expect to find effects of 182 drwr on industry employment and output.
183
In the empirical part, we consider the possible existence of downward rigidity at -2 184 and -5 percent (that is ∆w < −2 and ∆w < −5), preventing large real wage cuts, in 185 addition to real wage rigidity at zero. One motivation for this is from the theory model,
186
which predicts that the deficit of negative real wage changes is greater for large negative 187 changes than for small. Compositional changes may also transform downward rigidity 188 in individual wages at zero to downward rigidity in aggregate wages at a negative rate.
189
For comparison, we also consider nominal wage rigidity, that is if ∆w + π < 0, where π 190 is the rate of inflation. 
Thus, we have constructed 449 notional country-year distributions Z it ∼ G(µ it , P 75 it − 229 P 35 it ), each consisting of S H = 1, 331 wage-change observations. These notional country- Our null hypothesis is that there is no drwr, which corresponds to Z it having the 236 same distributions as ∆w it , while the alternative hypothesis of drwr corresponds to
237
Prob(∆w it < 0) < Prob(Z it < 0). For all country-year samples it, an estimate for the 238 probability of a notional real wage cutq it ≡ Prob(Z it < 0) is given by the notional 239 incidence rate of a real wage cut, i.e. the ratio of the number of notional real wage cuts 240 #z s it < 0 to total number of observations in the underlying distribution S
If we reject the null hypothesis of no drwr, we can go on to estimate the extent of 242 drwr by comparing the incidence rate of wage cuts in the notional distributions with 243 those of the empirical samples. The latter is given by
where #∆w jit < 0 is the number of empirical wage cuts and S it is the number of observations, both in country-year it. For country-years where there is at least one 246 notional real wage cut, implying thatq it > 0, we can calculate an often used measure of 247 downward wage rigidity, namely the fraction of wage cuts prevented, fwcp,
For example, in Austria in 1988, the incidence rate of notional real wage cuts,q it , is 249 0.11, while the empirical incidence rate, q it , is 0.06, implying that the fwcp is 0.45.
250
As there are only on average 21 industries in each country-year sample, there may be 251 considerable stochastic disturbances in µ it , P 75 it − P 35 it , and q it , which induce consid-252 erable disturbances inq it and fwcp it . Thus, estimates of drwr in single country-years 253 will be imprecise. Therefore, we focus on incidence rates and fwcp's at more aggre-254 gated levels, like regions, periods, and the full sample, where the estimates will be more 255 precise.
256
To test for the existence of drwr, we explore whether there are "too few" empir-
257
ical real wage cuts, as compared to the notional G distributions, i.e. without drwr.
258
This can be done by use of the formulae for binomial distributions, with the notional 259 probabilitiesq it . However, for the full sample of some 450 country-years, this is com- simulation results to obtain confidence intervals for our estimate of drwr.
269
A potential problem is that if drwr binds in some country-years, and compresses 270 the empirical wage change distribution from below to the extent that it affects the 35th percentile (and thus reduces the inter-percentile range) or increases the median, the 272 associated notional country-year sample will also be compressed from below. This will 273 involve a downward bias in the notional incidence rate of wage cuts,q it , and thus to a 274 downward bias in our estimate of drwr, i.e. a downward bias in the estimated fwcp.
275
This downward bias will also reduce the power of our test. However, if there is no drwr,
276
there will be no downward bias, so this will not affect the significance level of our test. for all regions, this estimate is only significant at 5 percent for the Core region.
4 Results

278
294
The middle columns display the results for drwr at -2 and -5 percent. We observe 295 that wages are more rigid at lower growth rates than at zero, with a fwcp in the full When we combine time periods and regions, we find that drwr at -2 and -5 percent 320 was prevalent in the Anglo, Core, and Nordic regions in the 1970s and 1980s (see Table   321 C1 in the supplemental material). In contrast, in the South, we do not find signifi- correlation between the estimates of dnwr and drwr at -2 percent.
330
The fraction of industry-years that are affected by downward rigidity can be calcu-331 lated by multiplying the incidence rate of notional wage changes by the fwcp for the 332 respective threshold. We find that 1.8 percent of all industry-year wage changes are 333 pushed up above the -2 percent threshold, which is higher than for any of the other 334 thresholds (see Table C3 in the supplemental material 
369
To explore whether drwr applies to expected real wages, rather than actual, we 370 have re-simulated the results from the main procedure using expected real wage changes,
371
where actual price level is replaced by the expected price level, and the latter is based 372 on expected inflation being derived as country-specific AR1 processes of actual inflation.
373
The results are qualitatively similar, even though the estimated fwcps are somewhat for the fwcp (as we condition on the simulated number of real wage cuts).
401
Inflation is found to have a positive effect on the incidence of real wage cuts. This is 402 not surprising, given that a positive inflation shock will reduce real wages. We also find 403 that inflation has a negative impact on the fwcp. and in the full sample only 4 out of 100 notional wage cuts are prevented by drwr.
433
However, we find stronger evidence of downward rigidity at negative real wage changes.
434
11 percent of the real wage changes below -2 percent growth are prevented by drwr,
435
and 18 percent of changes below -5 percent real wage growth are prevented.
436
The stronger downward rigidity at negative real wage changes is a key finding of our 437 study. It implies that one should not take frequent real wage cuts as indication that real 438 wages are flexible downwards, as the downward resistance can bind also at lower levels.
439
Possible effects on employment and output do not hinge on drwr being binding at zero,
440
it is sufficient that real wages are pushed up.
441
The stronger drwr at negative growth rates is consistent with our theoretical model, inflation, dnwr will also involve drwr, and it is indeed difficult to distinguish between 454 the two types of rigidity. However, as we also find some drwr in high inflation periods,
455
it seems clear that the drwr that we find is an independent phenomenon that is not 456 only caused by dnwr combined with a low inflation rate.
457
In contrast to most previous studies of drwr, which consider the wages of job stayers,
458
we use data for average wages at the industry level. 
484
There is fairly strong evidence that the variation in unemployment rates across time
485
and oecd countries is related to institutional labor market variables-like unemploy-486 ment benefits, union density, and the degree of coordinated wage setting-which are 487 likely to reflect differences in wage-setting behavior (see for example Nickell et al., 2003) .
Within this framework, one would expect increased wage pressure due to binding drwr Note: S is the number of observations, Y is the number of observed wage cuts below the relevant limit. drwr evaluated below −π percent is equivalent to evaluate dnwr at 0 percent. Supplemental Material
A The Nash Solution
The first order condition for the Nash bargaining solution requires that the left-hand derivative (that is w < w −1 , so that D = 1) of the Nash maximand satisfies
while the right-hand derivative (w ≥ w −1 ) satisfies
Furthermore, we know that either w = w −1 , or one of (A1) or (A2) hold with equality.
In the case where (A1) holds with equality, we obtain
while the case where (A2) holds with equality, we obtain
The lower critical values for V 0 and V L 0 , are found by imposing w = w −1 in (A3), and then solving for V 0 . As w − is strictly increasing in V 0 , it follows directly that w
It is also straightforward to show that w
0 is found by imposing w = w −1 in (A4), and then solving for V 0 . As w + is strictly increasing in V 0 , it follows directly that w
, the Nash maximand is maximized by equality in (A1), where w = w − < w −1 . For V 0 > V H 0 , the Nash maximand is maximized by equality in (A2) and w = w
, the Nash maximand is maximized by
, where both (A1) and (A2) hold, with strict inequalities in the interior of the interval. QED
B Data appendix
We have obtained wage data from Eurostat for all countries except Austria, Canada, Finland, New Zealand Norway, Sweden and the United States (see below). The precise source is Table hmwhour in the Harmonized earnings domain under the Population and Social Conditions theme in the newcronos database. Our wage variable (hmwhour) is labeled Gross hourly earnings of manual workers in industry. Gross earnings cover remuneration in cash paid directly and regularly by the employer at the time of each wage payment, before deducting taxes and social security contributions payable by wage earners and retained by the employer. Payments for leave, public holidays, and other paid individual absences are included in principle, in so far as the corresponding days or hours are also taken into account to calculate earnings per unit of time. The weekly work-hours of work are those in a normal working week (that is a week that does not include public holidays) during the reference period (October or the last quarter). These hours are calculated based on the number of hours paid, including overtime hours paid. Furthermore, we use wage data denominated in the national currency, and wages for men and women are included in the data. The data for Germany does not include the German Democratic Republic before 1990 or new Länder.
The data are recorded by classification of economic activities (nace Rev. 1). The sections represented are: Mining and quarrying (C), Manufacturing (D), Electricity, gas, and water supply (E) and Construction (F). We use data on various levels of aggregation from the section levels (for example D Manufacturing) to group levels (for example DA 159 Manufacturing of beverages), but use the most disaggregated level available in order to maximize the number of observations. If for example, wage data are available for D, DA 158 and DA 159, we use the latter two only to avoid counting the same observations twice.
Wage data for Austria, Canada, Finland, New Zealand, Sweden and the United States are from Table 5B "Wages in manufacturing" in laborsta, the Labor Statistics Database, ilo. The data are recorded by isic, three digit level covering the same sectors as the Eurostat data. Wage data for Norway are from Table 210 The average number of observations per country-year sample is 20.5, with a standard error of 4.7. The distribution of the number of wage cuts relative to the number of observations on years and countries is reported in Table B1 .
We have removed ten extreme observations from the sample. Data for inflation and unemployment are from the oecd Economic Outlook database. The primary sources for the employment protection legislation (epl) index, which is displayed in Holden and Wulfsberg (2008 , Table A .2), are oecd (2004) for the 1980-1999 period and Lazear (1990) for the years before 1980. We follow the same procedure as Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) to construct time-varying series, which is to use the oecd summary measure in the "Late 1980s" for 1980-89 and the "Late 1990s" for 1995-99. For 1990-94 we interpolate the series. For 1973-79 the percentage change in Lazear's index is used to back-cast the oecd measure. However, we are not able to reconstruct the Blanchard and Wolfers data exactly.
Data for union density is from oecd. For Greece, date for 1978 and 1979 are inter- Y e a r A u s t r i a B e l g i u m C a n a d a G e r m a n y D e n m a r k S p a i n F i n l a n d F r a n c e G r e e c e I r e l a n d I t a l y L u x e m b o u r g N e t h e r l a n d s N e w Z e a l a n d N o r w a y P o r t u g a l S w e d e n u k u s T o t a l 
C Tables
D Robustness
To explore the validity of assuming a common shape for all the notional distributions, we have undertaken Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of equality between the common underlying distribution against one alternative where the underlying distribution is constructed separately for each country (19 tests), and one alternative where the underlying distribution is constructed separately for each of the four time periods (27 tests). The assumption of a common underlying distribution passes easily in all 46 tests with the lowest p-value of 0.211. (In principle, also binding drwr should make the Kolmogorov-Smirnov be significant, but it seems that the test has too little power to detect this.) To further explore the robustness of our results, we perform an extensive sensitivity analysis of our main approach by varying the key assumptions. More specifically, we try different assumptions along three dimensions of the underlying notional distribution, namely the shape, the location, and the dispersion. As to the shape of the underlying distribution, in addition to the common distribution, we also try distributions that are country-specific and period-specific. In particular, we construct the underlying notional distribution separately for each country (period), based on all observations from this country (period), and then proceed with the method as before. For the location of the distribution, we follow Knoppik and Beissinger (2003) by also trying the 80th percentile, the motivation is that in some country-years, the median wage change is potentially affected by drwr, while this is rarely the case for the 80th percentile. For the dispersion of the distribution, we consider two alternatives to the inter-percentile range. As the 35th percentile potentially is quite often affected by drwr, we also consider an alternative that does not rely on any specific percentile, the mean deviation from the mean (mdev). However, if drwr is at work, it will compress the left part of the distribution and thus reduce both these dispersion measures, inducing a downward bias in our measure of downward rigidity. To avoid this, we also measure dispersion by the predicted interpercentile range, found in country-specific regressions of the actual inter percentile ranges on the lagged inter percentile range; inflation; the average inter percentile range in other countries in the same region; a trend; and a squared trend. Note that several of these alternative measures are likely to involve considerably more random noise than the main measures (mdev and the 80th percentile are sensitive to outliers, while the predicted ipr is sensitive to prediction error). Thus, we would expect considerable variation in the estimated fwcp. However, trying such diverse sets of measures provides information about the robustness of the broad picture. Taken together, to construct the notional distributions we use 18 different combinations of three distributional shapes (common, country-specific, or period-specific) × two measures of location (median or 80th percentile) × three dispersions (ipr, mdev, or predicted ipr). Figure D1 presents measures of the 18 estimates of the fwcp for each of the limits 0, -1, -2, -5 and −π percent (that is nominal zero). The estimates from Table 1 are indicated with a dot, a cross indicates an estimate that is significant at the 5 percent level, while the plus signs indicate fwcp estimates that are not significant. The number above the estimates is the number of significant estimates. We observe that while there is considerable variation in the estimates, the main features from the Table 1 still hold. There is clear evidence of drwr at -2 and -5 percent growth rates in the overall sample, where 17 and 14 of the 18 fwcp estimates are significant. There is some evidence of drwr at zero or -1 percent, but these point estimates are closer to zero, and few are significantly larger than zero. The evidence for dnwr is stronger than the evidence for drwr, with higher fwcp estimates, where 18 are significant. In the other panels of Figure D1 , we display similar charts for time periods and regions. There is considerable variation, yet the broad picture is not affected. Overall, there is clear evidence of drwr, although the extent is moderate. Significance levels and FWCPs are higher at -2 and -5 percent than at zero, and also weaker and smaller in the South than in the other regions.
